



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28 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance


SUBJECT: Requirements for U-2 Reconnaissance
Over USSR

1. On instruction of the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, the Chairman of COMOR requested a special meeting of the COMOR to consider sharpening and refining the requirements paper just submitted as COMOR-D-47/5.

2. As a means of focusing upon these requests, there is submitted in the attached document prepared by [redacted] CIA. It will be considered at the special meeting at 9:30 a.m., 29 September 1961, in the office of the Chairman.

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
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James O. Reber
Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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
Requirements for U-2 Reconnaissance Over USSR

1. As indicated in 11-8/1-61, the recent accumulation of KEYHOLE, electronic [] information has already provided a firmer basis for our estimate of current Soviet ICBM and MRBM strength than we have ever had before. Although we cannot be sure, we believe that additional evidence is likely to refine rather than materially change our estimate. We are also aware, however, that the policymaker's ability to place full confidence in the estimate is still weakened by the existence of a minority view to the effect that the ICBM threat is twice as large as that estimated by the majority.

2. In our view, therefore, the primary need is to pursue the photographic search of those remaining areas of the USSR in which ICBMs and MRBMs could be deployed, so as to determine whether or not additional launching complexes exist. This, in our view, is best accomplished by continued satellite missions. It could also be accomplished by U-2 search missions, but the more limited area which can be covered by a single U-2 mission would require a larger number of such missions.

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


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3. Another important need is to acquire firmer information on the operational status, salvo capability, extent of hardening, type of guidance, nature of support and missile handling facilities, and refire capability of the ICBM and MRBM installations which have been positively or tentatively identified. Although this would not be likely to change the estimate significantly from the point of view of highest national policy, it would be of great value in terms of military planning and intelligence analysis. From the intelligence point of view, it would greatly assist in validating other types of evidence and providing firmer guides as to the likely nature of the threat in the future.

4. The matters referred to in paragraph (3) almost certainly cannot be resolved with satellite photography of present quality. U-2 photography, however, has in the past provided sufficient detail so that we believe that even a single mission covering certain critical missile bases would contribute significantly to the solution of these outstanding problems. This assumes that the photography acquired is of good quality, and the weather over the targets is clear.

5. Given the continuation of satellite photographic missions at about the current level of operations, we therefore believe that the requirements




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
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


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


of estimates contributing to highest national policy can be met without re-instituting U-2 operations at this time. Because of the possibility of adverse political consequences as a result of discovery that U-2 operations had been re-instituted, and recognizing that there is a chance that the aircraft might be lost on Soviet territory, we cannot strongly recommend a U-2 mission solely on the basis of military planning and intelligence needs at this time. If a mission or missions are laid on, however, the targets described below are our highest priority targets.

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
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
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